Fake metals in airplane parts thanks to China

I wonder how serious or frequent an issue this.
Unfortunately it happens with some regularity at all levels. For example there was a UK company busted last year selling "bogus" parts to several airlines. Fortunately 99% of the time the "counterfeit" portion is the only the documentation and not the part itself. Same for this incident as well at this point. The only thing that makes an aviation part legal is the accomping documentation.

Regardless my guess the only reason you even heard about it was because it involved Boeing even though Airbus was equally affected but was only mentioned as an after thought vs included in the headline. Seems only Boeing aircraft have issues nowadays....:rolleyes:
 
The 99% though raises I think the classic question regarding regulation. I don’t think I know how it plays out here but will raise the question anyway.

Presumably the real objective with regulating this sort of thing is to improve the safety of flight and protect the flying public from a disaster due to a bad part.

So if detecting a bad part which might cause a disaster is a true positive, or hit, that implies these procedures have at best a 99% false positive rate. So what sort of true positive or hit rate does one have?

In any testing procedure one can achieve a 100% hit rate or a 100% true negative rate. It is the tradeoff between them that matters and how you weigh the cost of errors against the cost of the procedure.

I have to wonder if the traveling public would be better off by completely deregulating the whole industry and letting the companies, their insurers, and the public judging reputation decide on the best tradeoff here.

I know that idea is extremely far from the status quo and so we don’t have the concrete data with modern commercial aviation, but I do have to wonder giving the clear moral advantages of freedom.
 
I don’t think I know how it plays out here but will raise the question anyway.
Your off in your assessment. And you're off tangent enough that I can't figure a way to bring it back in with your examples. But it has zero to do with "99% false positive rate" in the context you provide. So I'll try this way.....

First, aviation is a closed industry. Any product, article, raw material, etc. that enters this closed system is tracked in various ways depending on the item. The end result of this tracking is only one of many tasks that are used to "improve the safety of flight and protect the flying public from a disaster due to a bad part."
But as with any closed system there are weaknesses than can be exploited by persons who want to defeat that system.

One weakness in todays world is the ability to forge airworthiness documentation via digital means which is why I commented that 99% of the time its the documents that are forged but the part actually meets its design approval. So the part is physically okay but the paperwork is not. The 1% of actual faked or altered parts rarely even make it through the receiving/installation process however there have been cases where they have. But even with the faked documents on the titanium, they were able to trace it to Turkey then back to China. That is how the closed system is designed to work. Its this traceability/trackability so that is so important that any issue can be researched and corrected to keep people safe even when things are forged.

So if you read into the history of how the aviation regulations have matured over the years you will see why "deregulating" the whole industry will result in quite the opposite effect than what you envision. And would cause me to leave the industry if I couldn't believe in the authenticity of the Form 8130-3 I received with that new engine I got to install in your aircraft. Think about that for a minute.......
 
It is a very different perspective certainly. But a few things you raise I think are worth thinking more about.

First is the idea that we can’t analyze this as a testing problem. Why? How could that possibly even be true?

If the outcomes are defined, in this case, a bad part making it into an airplane, we can define the number of trials as the number of parts placed in airplanes in any given year. We can say the testing procedures have to answer on each trial whether the part is good or bad. And then for each trial there is the truth, whether it was good or bad. Based on those numbers one can define the standard four detection theory outcomes - hit, miss, false alarm, and true negative.

This is standard theory for any testing procedure and I don’t see why one can’t apply it here.
 
First is the idea that we can’t analyze this as a testing problem. Why?
How would you define the data required for the testing across many different disciplines within the industry?
we can define the number of trials as the number of parts placed in airplanes in any given year.
How would you identify and collect the number of number of parts installed in airplanes each year?

FYI: most civil aviation authorites have established processes to deal with the detection and removal of bogus aircraft parts. But keep in mind the overall percentages of bogus parts entering the closed aviation is statistically small mainly due to the regulatory tracebility requirements. So given the amount of parts found in an average current model airliner alone, I'm a bit uncertain what you hope to accomplish with your testing methods?
 
Some thoughts:

Counterfeit auto parts are a fairly lucrative target market if my searches on "counterfeit auto parts accident statistics" are any indication. All the articles warn of their dangers, at least one claiming an epidemic of accidents, but did not provide a source for that claim and I could not immediately find any supporting studies or even mention of a single accident. I have no doubt such accidents exist - but I get the impression manufacturers are mainly upset with their intellectual property rights being ignored.

I also notice that while a lot of structural parts used in experimental aircraft include parts from the same sources as certified aircraft, there are no doubt many that come from the proverbial local hardware store. I vaguely recall reading at least one experimental accident where the builder used bolts from a hardware store. It may have been causal. But I think accident stats rarely cite untraced structural parts as causal in crashes of experimentals.

As to deregulation - I think if governments had never required tracing documentation (wikipedia suggests they appeared in the 1940s) then aircraft manufacturers would have adopted their own solutions since they would be the target of lawsuits. Traceability regs may be providing a liability crutch wherein the manufacturers don't bother to perform their own due diligence. With no tracing regs the manufacturers who don't want to be sued into oblivion would employ more due diligence by demanding insight into their part supplier's manufacturing and sourcing before purchasing from them. Or the manufacturers would build more parts in-house to allow better control over part quality, i.e. a more vertical business model.

It is interesting, and perhaps not coincidental, that problems arose with the quality of Spirit AeroSystems work after it was split off from Boeing and to correct the problem with an essential supplier Boeing is proposing to buy it back.
 
As to deregulation - I think if governments had never required tracing documentation (wikipedia suggests they appeared in the 1940s)
The one item you’re missing is that aviation is “regulated” on an international level. The reason traceability and dozens of other requirements were implemented in the 40s was due to the Chicago Convention and the formation of ICAO. This agreement allowed any member’s aircraft, parts, and to an extent personal to operate freely between member countries without any local certifications.

Without that agreement and a number of other international bilateral agreements, every aircraft, part, or crew license/certificate would need to be validated/certified per local rules. So for example, instead of a Boeing aircraft certified in the US or an Airbus aircraft certified in France being unilaterally certified in each ICAO member country by agreement, each country would require a separate full-blown internal certification for the aircraft.

This is why part traceability requirements, pilot certificate requirements, mechanic certificate requirements, etc. are done the way they are so that any aircraft can travel to any member country and be accepted. These agreements also included a number of other issues like customs and duties on aircraft and parts, etc. with most international airports being a “trade free zone” for aircraft and support items.

Without these agreements at the international level, aviation would have never expanded like it did. There are plenty of books, articles, etc that explain this in greater deal. Can you image how far Cessna would have gone back in the 40s if they had to pay for a certification in each country they planned to sell a Cessna 120 to? This is why around 80% of most country’s civil aviation regulations are specifically written to meet these international requirements (ICAO) to include the FARs... which are the most flexible of any other major aviation based country.
With no tracing regs the manufacturers who don't want to be sued into oblivion
As to civil litigation, basically only the US has a tort system that could sue a company into oblivion. Most other countries don’t even come close or have no tort system at all. This is why whenever possible foreign plaintiffs will try hard to find standing to sue in the US. And if you look deep enough you’ll records of such.
 
As to civil litigation, basically only the US has a tort system that could sue a company into oblivion. Most other countries don’t even come close or have no tort system at all. This is why whenever possible foreign plaintiffs will try hard to find standing to sue in the US. And if you look deep enough you’ll records of such.
I don't see any reason to believe that somehow government regulation is needed for an international market to expand. If there is an actual need, market forces will create a solution. In this case, for example, is it is likely that the possibility of being sued into oblivion would create private agencies in the US to certify parts.

Then people in foreign countries would likely come to rely in their local legal jurisdictions on such certifications. There is nothing magical about people who use threats of violence (i.e. the government) that makes them uniquely better at certifying parts.
 
I am not sure that products liability litigation has really made people safer. The problem with safety regulation and torts is that it essentially creates a system where lawyers figure out the minimum that can be done to avoid liability and no more. Look at Boeing, all the lawyers and regulators have not made them any safer.
 
I don't see any reason to believe that somehow government regulation is needed for an international market to expand.

They realized in 1947 in order for the aviation to grow internationally it would require an international regulatory standard accepted by all members you chose to join. The result was ICAO.

For example, there is not or ever has been, a single aviation entity that could afford to pay for certification in every country it chose to market their aircraft, engine, or any other similar item. For more info, read up on the 1947 Chicago Convention and creation of ICAO.

And since those early days, there have been additional bi-lateral aviation agreements that build on ICAO agreement between various countries. For example, the US is signatory to numerous bi-lateral agreements, each specific to the tasks and countries.

Without those agreements aircraft/part sales would be very limited to where they could operate/sell outside their native country which is still seen today for those countries who are not ICAO members or do not follow those international standards. For example, Russian and Chinese built aircraft are limited where they can operate or be sold.

Another example is the reason the TCCA owner maintained aircraft can never leave Canada. Those aircraft no longer meet the ICAO standard.

If there is an actual need, market forces will create a solution.
Except regulations are needed to keep a level playing field and keep people honest. Unfortunately, even today with the current regulatory system certain people prefer to not follow the rules for purely financial gains resulting in unsafe situations, aircraft damage, and even death.

In my experience, regulations "guard" the industry and give a mechanism to slam those who believe regulations do not apply to them for whatever reason. No market based system could come close.

The problem with safety regulation and torts is that it essentially creates a system
Problem is tort and regulation are completely separate and have no common ground. There are a number of legal records out there where not a single regulation was violated yet a plaintiff still won a tort judgement.
 
In my experience, regulations "guard" the industry and give a mechanism to slam those who believe regulations do not apply to them for whatever reason. No market based system could come close.
I do trust that is your experience and considered view. But I guess what I wonder is what sort of real data and analysis is there about this in aviation?

In general there is a large academic literature on the effects of regulation on business segments. And a rather good case is made by the Austrian school and von Mises that a regulatory regime does not benefit consumers overall despite its stated objectives.

Is there hard data to suggest that somehow aviation is exceptional in this regard?

(Nice to see your posts again.)
 
But I guess what I wonder is what sort of real data and analysis is there about this in aviation?
Plenty. The aviation industry is one of the few, if not the only one, where numerous countries accept each others laws and rules based on face value only. So there are a number papers out there on how it works.

If you use the history of ICAO and the 1944 Chicago Convention (not 1947) as a reference it should take you to the data and "analysis" you seek.

And a rather good case is made by the Austrian school and von Mises that a regulatory regime does not benefit consumers overall despite its stated objectives.
Actually the real world data shows that ICAO regulatory acceptance benefits the consumer with a higher level of safety, security, service, and so on. And a lack of ICAO acceptance is quite the opposite and even makes the news when the results are extreme.

But that doesnt mean an ICAO member cant manage how they comply with those standardized regulations. For example, the US Aviation Deregulation Act had no effect on their ICAO status. But even though it gave the consumer cheap tickets, the Act created a new series of aviation related issues on the consumer with some happening even today.

So context is everything when you attempt to analysis the data to study the regulatory affects on the aviation industry. Aviation has always been considered the red-headed step child of the business world since it tends to follow a quite different path than most industries.
 
Plenty. The aviation industry is one of the few, if not the only one, where numerous countries accept each others laws and rules based on face value only. So there are a number papers out there on how it works.

If you use the history of ICAO and the 1944 Chicago Convention (not 1947) as a reference it should take you to the data and "analysis" you seek.
I will have a look. I just did my first search on scholar.google.com with keywords "effect of icao regulation on airline safety". There are quite a few hits (25000) though the titles don't necessarily look terribly promising to me in terms of real data and analysis.

I will do my usual procedure and look though the titles of the first 100 to see which abstracts may be worth scanning. That will take a bit. But if you have suggestions of which are best, it would be most appreciated.
 
A good place to start is with the Convention Articles linked below. Once I complete my travels I'll see if I have any similiar links in my bookmarks.
1944 Chicago Convention Articles
I will look forward to your further thoughts when you are back. I must confess I see nothing in those articles which I would think of as data and analyses. Now maybe I missed them but I suspect there is a real disconnect in understanding here.

I would say those contain some goals and aspirations, but no data or analysis considering the impact of such regulations on the safety or affordability of commercial flying.
 
I must confess I see nothing in those articles which I would think of as data and analyses.
As I had noted above, the history and articles were to be used as a reference to build a search for the data and analysis. IMO in order to look for something one needs a basic foundation of the subject to find the details.

Maybe this link will point to some data analysis reports?
https://www.americanbar.org/content.../air_space_lawyer/Winter2019/as_copyright.pdf
 
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